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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine Union conduct
in Alabama toward non-combatants and private property.
The status of international law and the United States
Army's experience with and regulation of conduct has been
surveyed.

This survey established a standard to compare

with the conduct in Alabama.
General histories of the war, Union company histories
and personal histories were consulted to determine what took
place in Alabama.
Generally, conduct in Alabama did not meet the standard
laid down by international law or even Army regulations.

No

single factor appeared to be the major cause, although the
use of a largely non-professional body of troops was probably
the main reason for such general misconduct.

RONALD EDWARD COLVIN
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA

THE JUST OBJECTS OF WAR

INTRODUCTION
Throughout history non-combatants have suffered during
wars, even though they take no active part in the hostilities.
Western civilization has recognized that these citizens and
their property deserve protection, inaccordance with stan
dards known collectively as international law.

This paper

will study the conduct of the Union army in Alabama during
the Civil War.
To accomplish such a study it is important to understand
standards of conduct followed during the mid-nineteenth cen
tury.

Looking at the record from today's perspective, one's

interpretation may be colored by the United States' recent
experiences with war, i.e. World War II, Korea and Viet Nam.
To better appreciate the Union field soldier's position a
brief look at international law as it was understood at the
time is included.

This is not to suggest, however, that the

common soldier was familiar with international law and guided
his actions accordingly.

More important to the understanding

of the Union soldier's perspective is an examination of United
States Army regulations for the period, as well as the army's
experience in the Mexican War, which guided many Federal of
ficers': decisions on troop conduct during the Civil War.
Unlike Virginia, Tennessee, and Mississippi, Alabama did
not see large-scale combat.

Instead, a Union army was faced

by small bands of home guards and cavalry, which were quickly
labeled guerrillas.

Alabama was visited by Union forces for

two reasons; to secure the Tennessee Valley as a transportation
2

corridor for the Union, and to raid the interior portions of
the state in order to destory sources of supplies for the
Confederate army.
Conduct will be examined in light of the two different
Union objectives and the different tactics employed to accom
plish them.

The Tennessee Valley saw long periods of

occupation, while large cavalry raids of short duration were
employed to strike into the heart of Alabama.

The effect

on Federal forces of a large population with Unionist senti
ment will also be examined.

3

Chapter I
International Law
At the time of the Civil War the United States had
no codified rules of conduct governing the treatment of
civilians and private property.

International law, however,

provided a loose code of conduct for belligerents.
A short definition of international law from the
Ericyclopaedia of the Social Sciences reads as follows:
International Law is a binding body of rules ap
plied by and to states in their international
intercourse.
...The sources or agencies by which
the rules of international law are formulated are
either usage, giving rise to custom, or positive
agreement or treaties.1
The origin of international law lies in the commercial
and diplomatic intercourse of the ancient western civil
izations, i.e., the Greeks, the Romans and the Jews.

Their

distinctions between friendly and hostile peoples, their
treaties with other nations, their conduct of war, and their
making of peace illustrate early principles of international
law.

Modern international law is most often traced to the

writings of Hugo Grotius, 1583-1645, and his work De Jure
belli ac pacis....

A Dutch jurist and statesman, Grotius

codified international law as it then existed.

"The impor

tance of Grotius' work lies in the fact that it exerted so
profound an influence, not only on theory, but on

p r a c t i c e . ' ' ^

International law grew by accepting,a& precedents, rules
adopted among the major powers in negotiated treaties of
peace, or the decisons of prize courts and other bodies
established to determine international legal relations.
4
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It was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
that international law reached an important stage in its
development.

The treatises on international law by Grotius,

Vitoria, Pufendorf and others also included laws of warfare.
The idea that the power of the belligerent in waging war was
not unlimited gained credence.3

The laws of warfare were de

veloping within international law, and each war added to the
precedent of what was considered humane and reasonable con
duct.

In 1818, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle formally re

cognized the law of nations as the basis for international
relations.4

This same period saw the development of a basic

tenet of modern international law.

This was the principle

that all nations were bound under a doctrine of international
law, even though the precedent action involved other nations.
By the nineteenth century, international law had
evolved into a mass of confusing rules, little understood by
regular United States Army officers, let alone a volunteer
private.

During the Mexican War, United States Army officials

often had to deal with questions concerning international law.
One of the officers required to answer these questions was
Brevet Captain Henry W. Halleck.

He served in California as

Secretary of State under Generals Mason and Reily, and as
chief of staff of General Burton's operations in Lower Calif
ornia.

His service as aide-de-camp to Commodore Shubrick and

as lieutenant-governor of Mazatlan gave him added experience
with international law.
Halleck, a West Point graduate, resigned from the re
gular army in 1854 and opened what was to become one of the
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leading law firms in California.

Between 1854 and the out

break of the Civil War, he wrote several works dealing with
law and military tactics.;

In 1861, he published a compendium

of international law for officers in the army and navy.
Halleck relied on his practical experience in the Mexican War
as well as the major European treatises.
In August, 1861, he was commissioned a Major General
in the regular United States Army.

In 186 2, he was made

military advisor to the President with the title of Generalin-Chief, a position he held for almost two years and from
which he was able to influence the a rmy1s adherence to the
rules of international law.

In March of 1864, he was named

Chief of Staff of the Army, a position concerned mainly with
office work and more compatible with his organizational
talents.

Halleck*s treatise, entitled International L a w ,

served to illustrate the position of the United States govern
ment on standards of military conduct, and particularly the
United States Army's understanding of international law at
the onset of the Civil War.

Its ideas continued to be influ

ential throughout the war.
International law had long recognized a difference be
tween combatants and non-combatants.

Although the national

istic warfare of the Napoleonic era had confused the issue,
there remained a definite standard.

Halleck reported:

Thus, while we may lawfully kill those who are
actually in arms and continue to resist, we may
not take the lives of those who are not in arms,
or who, being in arms, cease their resistance
and surrender themselves into our p o w e r . 5

7
As a result of the levee en masse and nationalistic war, the
idea of considering all inhabitants of the adversary nation
as enemies,

(no longer protected against the direct operations

of war) gained in popularity.

By 1861, however, thought on

the subject had returned to protection of the non-combatant
as an international legal obligation.

In discussing those

persons who were exempt from such operations, Halleck listed:
"Feeble old men, women, and children, and sick persons..."

g

Even though they were enemies and were subject to the army
as members of a community at war, they were enemies who made
no resistance.

Halleck said, "We have no right to maltreat

their persons, or to use any violence toward them, much less
7
take their lives.."
Included in the list of persons with
this right of protection in 1861 were several professions.
As long as the persons remained non-combatants, members of
the religious, educational, and agricultural professions as
well as artists, laborers, and merchants were protected.

In

sum, Halleck believed that international law protected all
those who took no part in war and made no resistance to the
arms of the adversary nation.

8

In discussing the rights of inhabitants of an occupied
area, Halleck was more specific.

He once again reaffirmed the

principle of protection only for the non-combatant.

He

stressed the fact that once a person began to resist, protection
ceased.
...if the peasantry and common people of a country
use force, or commit acts in violation of the milder
rules of modern warfare, they subject themselves to
the common, fate of military men, and sometime to
still harsher treatment.9

8
As long as they remained non-combatants, they were to be
allowed the enjoyment of their property and the pursuit of
their vocation.

However, Halleck and international law

left a "loop-hole" for the rights of the military commander.
Halleck wrote that if the commander had any reason to
mistrust the inhabitants, he had a right to disarm them and
to require security for their good conduct.

Halleck also

considered it proper to imprison inhabitants to prevent them
from taking up arms or in order to weaken the enemy.

He con

sidered it permissible to confine even women and children if
circumstances, as determined by the commander, rendered such
an action necessary "in order to secure the just objects of
war.”^

Military commanders had considerable leeway.

Re

pressive measures against a populace could be justified by
military necessity.

Each commander could have his personal

view of what each situation required.
In some cases the only guaranteed right of the noncombatant was life.

The military commander, however, was

not entirely free to do as he chose.

He had to justify his

repressive actions, or the enemy might carry out reprisals,
or he might, face public condemnation: under "moral law".
Concerning the subject of property in areas coming
under the control of a belligerent armed force, one has to
deal with a long history of changing principles.

The ancient

practice gave the invading belligerent the right of seizure
and confiscation of all private property.

These rights were

modified through the years until plunder and wanton destruc
tion were condemned.

By 1861, certain types of property were
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recognized as being exempt from capture.

Also, compensation

for the requisition of private property was a universal
principle, but not always followed by the soldiers in the
field.

,
However, there were exceptions to this "rule" of

compensation.
The modern usage is, not to touch private property
on land, without making compensation, except in
certain specified cases.
These exceptions may be
stated under three general heads;
1st, confisca
tions or seizures by way of penalty for military
offenses; 2d, forced contributions for the sup
port of the invading armies, or as an indemnity
for the expenses of maintaining order, and af
fording protection to the conquered inhabitants;
and 3d, property taken on the field, or in
storming a fortress or t o w n . H
The laws of warfare relied to a great extent on the
morality of the individual commander to determine what was
correct and proper conduct toward non-combatants and pri
vate property.

However, it did give the commander several

guidelines to follow concerning the correct treatment of
property.

Exempted from operations of war were works of

art, state papers, public archives, historical records and
legal documents.
in the exemption.

Also, several structures were included
These were such buildings that were

devoted to civil purposes only, those of religious character,
public edifices and all monuments of art and repositories of
science.

Halleck stated that such destruction would not aid

the war effort and, on the contrary, would cause the populace
to harbor resentment that would last long after the war.

12

Recognizing that excesses are committed during the
war, international law, combined with the American experience
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in Mexico, led Halleck to devise a formula for fixing
responsibility.

Recalling the experience of trying to

control volunteer troops in Mexico, Halleck placed them in •
a somewhat separate category, seemingly to protect the
honor of the regular army.

He stated:

It is true that soldiers sometime commit excesses
which their officers cannot prevent; but, in gen
eral, a commanding officer is responsible for the
acts of those under his orders, unless he can con
trol his soldiers, he is unfit to command them.
The most atrocious crimes in war, however, are
committed by militia, and volunteers, suddenly
raised from the population of large cities, and
sent to the field before the general has time or
opportunity to reduce them to order and discipline.
In such cases the responsibility of their crimes
rests upon the state which employed them, rather
than upon the general who is, perhaps, unwillingly
obliged to use t h e m . 13
In many cases, excesses committed by soldiers in the
field resulted from living off the land, a practice still
prevalent in the mid-nineteenth century.

During the Civil

War, great advances were made in the science of logistics.
Federal quartermasters prided themselves on the quantity
and quality of supplies provided the troops.

Railroads were

utilized to a great extent for the swift supply of the armies,
but they were often inadequate, forcing supplemental local
"requisitions".

In many cases, however, the army simply

made it. a policy to live off the land.

Recognizing the

dangers of unregulated foraging and the power of an army to
confiscate as it pleased, international law dealt with the
subject at length.

Halleck,. in compiling his findings, wrote:

The evils resulting from irregular requisitions
and foraging for the ordinary supplies of an army,
are so very great and so generally admitted that

it has become a recognized maxim of war, that the
commanding officer who permits indiscriminate
pillage, and allows the taking of private property
without strict accountability, whether he be en
gaged in offensive or defensive operations, fails
in his duty to his own government, and violates
the usages of modern w a r f a r e . ^
Halleck made it clear that due restitution should be
made to the victims of pillage by deductions from the pay
and allowances of the corps which committed the excess.
If, however, pillage was the result of the army ordered
into circumstances where proper logistical support was not
possible, responsibility was transferred to the government,
as it had failed to make proper provision for the support
of its troops or had required services which could not be
performed without injury to the inhabitants of the hostile
country. 15
Even though Halleck cleared the commander of the
responsibility for such action in the above mentioned cir
cumstances, he clearly disapproved generally of the practice.
He advocated the maintenance of a regular magazine for the
subsistence of an army.

Recognizing that this was not altf

ways possible, and knowing that forced contributions was
still, a recognized right, Halleck nevertheless recommended
that a cautious policy should be declared and just com
pensation made for items taken.

International legal thought

had come to see the consequence of individual foraging as
"universal pillage, and a total relaxation of discipline,
the loss of private property and the violation of individual
rights".16
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Clearly a thin line was drawn between what was con
sidered just and unjust in the process of finding subsist
ence for an army, but certainly a commander was obligated to
be in control of his men and restrain all individual con
fiscation.

Admittedly, international law in 1861 left a

great deal of uncertainty.

One restriction upon the in

vading army, however, was very clear, as Halleck found in
his research.

"There is no doubt, whatever, respecting its

[an enemy's property] waste and useless destruction.

This

is forbidden alike by law of nature, and the rules of war."

17

Another aspect of property in war dealt with by inter
national law was the right of title to captured material.
Soldiers had long considered the booty captured during the
course of a campaign as their personal property.

This arose

out of the practice in previous wars in which such booty
was considered part of the soldiers1 compensation.

With the

rise of nationalistic armies, soldiers were regularly pro
vided subsistence and monetary compensation.

This develop

ment caused international legal thought to advocate the
following principle in 1861.
All captures in war, whether conquests, prizes or
booty, naturally belong to the state in whose name,
and by whose authority they are made.
It alone
has such claims against the enemy as will authorize
the seizure and conversion of his property; the
military forces who make the seizures are merely
the instruments of the state, employed for this
purpose; they do not act on their individual re
sponsibility, or for their individual benefit.
They, therefore, have no other claim to the booty
or prizes which they may take, than their govern
ment may see fit to allow them.1**
International law concerning troop conduct was not al
ways clear.

Generally speaking, the invading army had many
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rights over the inhabitants , but "moral law" restricted
%■ *

their implementation, except under obvious hostile con
ditions.

Along with the rights an invading army possessed,

it also had many duties to the subjugated populace.

It

had the responsibility of providing a government under
which non-combatants could pursue their occupations in as
nearly normal conditions as possible.

Wanton destruction

and pillage were clearly condemned, responsibility lying
not only with the commander, but with the nation-state.
In summing up the correct policy toward an invaded or
occupied land, Halleck quoted Emmer de Vattel.
The general rule by which we should regulate our
conduct toward an enemy, is that of moderation,
and on no occasion should we unnecessarily de
stroy his property.
'The pillage and destruction
of towns,' say Vattel, 'the devastation of the
open country, ravaging and setting fire to houses,
are measures no less odious and detestable, on
every occasion when they are evidently put into
practice without absolute necessity, or at least
very cogent reasons.
But as the perpetrators of
such outrageous deeds might attempt to palliate
them under pretext of deservedly punishing the
enemy, be it here observed that the natural and
voluntary law of nations does not allow us to
inflict such punishment, except for enormous
offences against the law of nations .^
Overshadowing the American Civil War, though, was
the debate as to whether international law actually applied.
Many, including Lincoln, believed that only municipal law
applied.

The South was seen as a rebellious population

usurping federal power on federal territory and thus to be
suppressed in terms of criminal law.

They saw the Confed

erates: as rebels and eligible for prosecution as traitors
and murderers.

Halleck did not deal extensively with civil

war in International L a w but the interpretation one ob-

14
tained was that a situation like that found in the
United States 1861-1865 should have been termed a
rebellion.

Eramer de Vattel, a Swiss jur±s~t whose The Law

of Nations was the most widely quoted foreign treatise in
the United States, was somewhat more generous in application
of international law for such situations.

20

He wrote m

1793:
When a party is formed in a state, who no longer
obeys the sovereign, and are possessed of suf
ficient strength to oppose him, — or when, in
a republic, the nation is divided into two op
posite factions, and both sides take up arms,—
this is called Civil W a r . A civil war breaks
the bands of society and government, or at least
suspends their force and effect? it produces in
the nation two independent parties, who consider
each other as enemies, and acknowledge no common
judge.
Those two parties, therefore, must neces
sarily be considered as thenceforward constituting,
at least for a time, two separate bodies, two
distinct societies.
They stand therefore in pre
cisely the same predicament as two nations, who
engage in a contest, and, being unable to come
to an agreement, have recourse to a r m s . 2 1
Many did not view the situation in this manner, they
assumed that to apply the term "civil war" and the juris
diction of international law to the conflict would mean re
cognizing the Confederate government as legitimate.

It

was not until the first battle of Manassas, when prisoners
were taken by the Confederates, that the questions was ad
dressed seriously.

Eventually, Lincoln was convinced that

granting the rules of war was not a tantamount to recognizing
legitimacy.

"Thus it may be said that the rights assumed in

occupied regions of the South were the recognized rights of
military occupation plus that authority which the Union gov
ernment exerted in the resumption of Federal functions and

in the temporary assumption of State functions while
awaiting the establishment of 'loyal1 State governments."

22

The conflict was termed an insurrection by the Federals ;
under international law, rebels could be tried for high treason.
Lincoln's position was compromised by the fact that he had,
according to contemporary international law, recognized the
Confederacy's belligerent rights when proclaiming a naval
blockade of the Southern coast on April 19, 1861.

Chapter II
United States Army Heritage
The Union army was not one that was highly versed
in the mysteries of international law.

Much of it was

made up of men taken from civilian life who had little con
cept of a soldier's duties, rights, or responsibilities.
Many times the lack of clear cut army directives forced
them to rely on their personal opinions or a known pre
cedent in United States Army history.
The regular army's regulations and articles of war
touched on the subject of proper conduct and were consistent
with prevailing international thought.

The problem was that

the bulk of the federal army was made up of volunteers, segre
gated organizationally from regular troops, who had little
sympathy for the rules governing the professional soldier,
especially if the rules appeared to delay the defeat of the
"secesh".
The Articles of War for the army dated from 1776.
These general rules of conduct were revised in 1786 and 1806,
with the latter revision remaining in effect for the Civil
War.

Two articles expressed themselves directly to the pro

blem of troop conduct.
Article fifty-two, stated in part:
Any officer or soldier...who shall quit his post
or colors to plunder and pillage,...being duly
convicted thereof, shall suffer death, or such
other punishment as shall be ordered by the
sentence of a general court-martial.
Article fifty-four addressed the question in more detail.
All officers and soldiers are to behave themselves
16
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orderly in quarters and on their march; and who
ever shall commit any waste or spoil, either in
walks of trees, parks, warrens, fish-ponds, houses,
or gardens, cornfields, enclosures of meadows, or
shall maliciously destroy any property whatsoever
belonging to the inhabitants of the United States,
unless by order of the then Commander-in-chief of
the armies of the said States, shall (besides such
penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished
according to the nature and degree of the offense
by the judgement of a regimental or general courtmartial. ^
The Regulations for the Army of the United States
also dealt with the subject of a soldier's conduct.

Al

though primarily concerned with such practical aspects as
how to properly dig a latrine or to define the proper feed
for a pack mule, it was consistent and supportive of the
Articles of War.

Regulation 787 stated:

Plundering and marauding, at all times disgraceful
to: soldiers, when committed on the persons or pro
perty of those whom it is the duty of the Army to
protect, become crimes of such enormity as to
admit no remission of the awful punishment which
the military law awards against offenses of this
nature.3
The varied and confused opinions on the status of the
citizens of the Southern Confederacy led many soldiers to
believe that these regulations did not apply.

However, the

Judge Advocate General of the Army, in January of 1866, re
viewed a case in which soldiers had been convicted under
article fifty-four.

They had "entered without authority the

house of an inhabitant, and committed waste and seized and
4
appropriated property therein."
The Judge Advocate General
held, "they were chargeable with a violation of this article
was evidently framed to punish such acts, under any circum5
stances, as breaches of military discipline."
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Although not clearly defined until after the war,
it was apparent that the army had an obligation to maintain
discipline.

Halleck had stated in International Law such

discipline included restricting individual actions by
soldiers, no matter the indentity or beliefs of the victim.
For far too many federal troops, army regulations
and codes of conduct were almost as mysterious as inter
national law.

Experience and the consensus of junior of

ficers 1 opinions guided the actions of many volunteer and
conscript troops.

The Mexican War proved to be the exper

ience that many of the senior members of the armed forces
used as a guide.

The United States had its first taste of

military government over an occupied area in that war.
Many aspects, though, were not the same.

In Mexico, the

United States was dealing with an acknowledged foreign
power, while during the Civil War it claimed to repressing
a domestic rebellion.

Nevertheless, experience with martial

law and military courts was gained during the Mexican War
that set a precedent for policy in the Civil War.
Congress in 1846 saw that hostile territory would
soon be coming under United States military control.

The

question of what would be the proper governmental adminis
trative policy for this territory was debated for several
days.

One position advocated was that of "no holds barred,"

but this was quickly rebutted.
The [Congress] relegated the realism of 1Inter
arma leges silent1 to the distant barbarous past.
They believed in progress and they defined civil
ization in moral terms.
[Congress] did not go

19

beyond the vague generalization that American com
manders in Mexico should be limited and controlled
by the 1law of nations' and the affirmation that
these laws stemmed ultimately from the fundamental
moral law.8
However, it was left to the army to implement a for
mula for a government.

General Winfield Scott on February

19th/ 1847, laid the foundation for a definite policy.

He

declared martial law in all areas of Mexico that were oc
cupied,. and set up a system of military courts previously
unknown to the United States military service.

This was a

military commission which could try both civilians and
soldiers accused of criminal actions within the occupied
areas.

These provisions were part of General Orders
7
No. 20,
issued from Tampico.
Also included in General
Orders No. 20 were the offenses that would be tried in the
tribunals.
Assassinations; murder; malicious stabbing or
maiming; rape; malicious assault and battery;
robbery; theft; the wanton desecration of
churches, cemeteries or other religious edifices
and fixtures, and the destruction, except by
order of a superior officer, of public or pri
vate property, and such offenses.8
This order, though tailored for the specific needs of the
Mexican situation, was a document which gave specific content
to the vague term "laws of. warfare" and provided for enforce
ment of those laws..
It was during the Mexican War that principles were de
vised to deal with guerrilla action.
invited guerrilla attack..
the nearest alcalde's
the guilty.

The long supply lines

Scott's reaction was that it was

(mayor's) responsibility to deliver up

If he chose not to, the alcalde was to be fined
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and any person known to belong to a guerrilla party could
be summarily tried by three officers, and either flogged
or excecuted.

This plan did not satisfy those having to

undergo the risks of attack and "in general, it was a tale
of merciless atrocities followed by merciless reprisals."

9

Villages suspected of harboring the "banditti" were burned.
In July, 1847, General J. E. Wool announced "that any
guerrillas caught by him would be executed.

In December,

1847, he issued his famous Order 11, which not only made
the Mexican authorities and their towns responsible for all
damages done, but required them to hunt down the 'brigands'."^
With these, and similar actions, the principle was
established that citizens residing near the scene of any
guerrilla action were to be held responsible and suffer for
them.

At the time of the capture of Mexico City, General

Scott held this theory of responsibility strongly.
Soon after the Americans entered it [Mexico City],
Mexicans fired upon them from houses.
Before long
the First Alcalde issued this warning:
*The Generalin-Chief [Scott] of the American forces which have
occupied the city this morning has informed the
Ayuntamiento [city council]' that if within three
hours, reckoned from the time this notice is posted,
there is not complete cessation of the acts of
hostility now being committed..., he will proceed
with all. rigor against the guilty permitting their
goods and property to be sacked and razing the block
in which are situated the houses from which the
American troops are fired upon.*
...These warnings were not effectual, however; and
General Worth wrote to his daughter, 'I caused the
heavy guns to be turned against every house from
which a shot came
... and after a few hours of
such appliance, not regarding where or who it hit,
quelled the dastardly villains.*11
By the end of the Mexican War, the above principle
had been accepted as policy by the United States Army and
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was to be revived in the Civil War.

Vattel in his classic

work on international law, The Law of Nations, dealt exten
sively with guerrilla actions.

Written in the late eight

eenth century the 1817 edition did not mention such a
policy or condone it under international law.

Halleck,

writing in 1861, from his interpretation of the Mexican
War, stated:

"It is a general law of war, that communities

12
are accountable, for the acts of their individual members.”

As General-in-Chief from July 1862 to March 1864,
Halleck played a major role in determining the army's com
pliance with international law.

A person whose opinion he

came to rely upon for answers to many legal questions was
Francis Lieber.

A native of Prussia, Lieber had fought in

the Waterloo campaign under Blucher and had been wounded
in the engagement.

After the war he joined and later be

came a leader in Friedrich Jahn's educational movement.
Its philosophy emphasized the need for physical training
and conditioning as an integral part of the educational
process.

It was during this period that Lieber joined

several liberal student groups and came under suspicion in
1819 by the reactionary governing officials.

He was refused

admission to Prussian universities and the University of
Heidelberg.

Finally, after great effort, he matriculated at

Jena University as a theology student, but soon switched to
liberal arts and specialized in mathematics.
In 1827, Lieber came to the United States to teach
swimming and gymnastics in Boston.

Enthusiasm for the sports

did not last, and his' business failed after a year.

He then

22
conceived the idea of an United States encyclopaedia.

He

convinced the firm of Carey, Lea and Carey to underwrite
him and publish it, and Encyclopaedia Americana was born.
This project afforded him the opportunity to move in the
intellectual circles of the young nation and gain many
friends and acquaintances.

Among the former he counted

Charles Sumner.
The year 1835 saw the reorganization of South Carolina
College, and Lieber was offered the newly established chair
of History and Political Economy.

He remained at the college

for twenty-one years and served from 1849 to 1851 as acting
president.

He wrote several essays and books while in South

Carolina, among them were Political Ethics on political phil
osophy and Civil Liberty, a political science text book.
Lieber was sharply critical of slavery, but he held a con
servative view toward property rights.

He believed only the

States could legally deal with slavery, causing him to break
with abolitionists and temporarily interrupt his friendship
with Charles Sumner.
Lieber was unhappy living in South Carolina and jumped
at the chance to fill the newly created chair of History and
Political Economy at Columbia University in 1857.
then that he joined the fledgling Republican Party.

It was
He was

to remain at Columbia throughout the war, offering legal ad
vice to anyone who would listen.

After the war broke out,

he. renewed his friendship with Charles Sumner and became
identified with "radical republicanism11.

Lieber corresponded

with Attorney General Edward Bates on legal questions; but
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Bates, a Whig, did not always follow his advice.

The Trent

affair in 1861 inspired Lieber to call for a congress of
publicists and authorities on international law to draw up
codes which would have the equivalent authority in inter
national law as the treatises of Blackstone, Kent, and Story
had in the realm of Common law.
however.

This idea came to: naught

It was also in 1861 that he revised his position

on Federal rights over slavery, stating that Federal auth
ority could abolish slavery.
Lieber had three sons who fought in the war, one for
the South and two for the North.

It was while he was on

his way to visit one of the latter who was wounded at Fort
Donelson, that he met General Halleck and initiated what
was to become an extended correspondence.
Halleck knew of Lieber's interest in international
law and its application to military situations.

In 1859,

Lieber had sought to introduce into West Point's curriculum,
with the backing of then General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, a
course on international law.

This effort was rebuffed by

West Point's commandant on the premise that the curriculum
was already overcrowded.

Halleck fully realized volunteer

officers lacked army tradition, discipline, and professional
concepts of the laws of war; West Pointers were little better
off.

NO concise manual existed that could be used by an of

ficer in the field.

In 1862, Halleck asked Lieber to write

a short essay on a particularly vexing problem, treatment of
guerrillas.

Army officers tended to classify anyone not in

a large military organization as a guerrilla.
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In August of 1862, Lieber presented his essay to
General Halleck.

Halleck read it, appreciated its concise

ness, and gave it his approval, ordering 5000 copies printed
for army distribution.

It dealt with defining the different

categories of guerrillas and the treatment to be accorded
each.

It did not mention community punishment for guerrilla

actions, but dealt only with the individual punishment to
be inflicted on the guerrilla.

Partisans were a part of the

regular army detached from the main body to engage in guer
rilla warfare.

Such persons were "part and parcel of the

army, and as such, considered entitled to the privileges of
the law of war. . .
Other types engaged in guerrilla actions, be they
brigands, deserters, or independent bands of the populace,
were not to be. accorded such a favor.

When captured in open

warfare, they would be treated as regular partisans until
special crimes could be proved against them.

These crimes

included murder, the killing of prisoners, or the sacking
of places.

14

Lieber concluded that the law of warfare would

not protect any bands who interrupted their normal non-com
batant lifestyle with sporadic fighting.
Lieber's treatise was well received, and with greater
areas of territory coming under occupation as the war pro
gressed, a need was seen for a clear statement of relevant
legal principles, as well as on the conduct of warfare.

in

November of 1862, Lieber drafted a formal letter to Halleck
suggesting the President appoint a committee, with Halleck
at its head, to study those questions on which the Articles

of War were silent.

Halleck did not respond until early

December when he wired Lieber to come to Washington to
serve on a special board created by the War Department.
This board, of which Lieber was the only civilian member,
was assigned to draw up a code for land warfare.
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Lieber

wanted to reform the entire military legal code, but was re
buffed by the other members.

The board sent form letters to

officers asking for suggestions; however, the response was
very light.

It fell to Lieber to do the actual work of

drawing up a code.
Lieber quickly prepared a draft during the first few
weeks of 1863.

His works, lectures, newspaper clippings,

tests on international law, and scholarly associates were
relied upon as sources.

In February, he brought the draft

to Washington for approval.

16

The Board decided that the

draft should be printed with large margins and several blank
pages in order that army officers and other critics could
note: suggestions.

Again few responded; but those ideas that

were received were incorporated into a new revision by Lieber.
This^ version was sent to the Board for its inspection at the
end of March..

It was. at this time Halleck suggested that

Lieber add a section on civil war, rebellion, and insurrection.
In April, 1863,. the code was issued as General Orders, No.
100.

17

11It', was a- conscious effort to carry into the office

of the military governor the old American concept of a
government of laws not of men.

General. Orders No. 100 was

the first formal attempt on the part of a national government,
either in Europe or in America, to translate the phrase 'laws
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of war* into a developed code."

18

The general order gave

substance to international law, but was o p e n :to much inter
pretation.

It did narrow the confines of previous inter

pretations so that great excesses could not be committed or
proposed by a zealous military commander or a radical pol
itician.

It placed penalties on wanton violence and destruc

tion, similar to those acts listed in Scott's order.

"All

robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place
by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or; killing of
such inhabitants, are prohibited under penalty of death, or
such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the
gravity of the offense."

19

It listed types of property that were to have special
protection.

"Classical works of art, libraries, scientific

collections, must be secured against all avoidable injury,
even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded."
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Non-combatants were also given

rights under the military occupation.

"Private citizens are

no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts,
and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his
private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can
afford to grant in the over-ruling demands of a vigorous
21
war."
However, it did leave two loopholes that could
negate the underlying humanitarian principles.

They were

military necessity and retaliation.
General Orders No. 100, while loosely codifying the
laws of warfare, also followed United States Army precedent.
It codified, the custom of placing occupied territory under
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martial law.

Military rule and force took over the func

tions of government.
courts.

Crimes were to be tried by military

Its issuance, half way through the war, gave the

commander a somewhat clearer picture of how to treat the
enemy's populace and property.
After its acceptance by the military, General Orders
No. 100 was made applicable to the period of the entire war.
The Judge Advocate General held that "where an accused is
charged with a violation of the laws of w a r , as laid down
in...General Orders No. 100...it is no defense that the
actual offence for which he was tried was committed before
the date of the order; the latter being merely a publication
and affirmance of the law of war as it had previously exrsted."
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Thus, neither side could claim ignorance for not

complying with the code anytime during the period of con
flict.
Codes, like laws, however, were made to be broken.
General Orders No. 100 while perhaps restraining some actions
by no means halted all mistreatment.

This can clearly be

seen in a letter written by Major-General William T. Sherman,
commander of the Department of the Tennessee, to Major R. M.
Sawyer, Assistant Adjutant General, stationed at Huntsville,
Alabama, in January, 1864.

Major Sawyer had asked Sherman's

opinion of how to treat inhabitants known or suspected to be
hostile or "secesh".

Sherman acknowledged that the Contin

ental European rule was to confine war to the armies and not
visit it upon the homes of families or private interests.
But Sherman knew of other examples and precedents.

He cited
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particularly the English occupation of Ireland during the
reign of William and Mary, when the natives were dis
possessed of their property and a new population introduced.
Speaking directly to the situation in North Alabama,
Sherman stated:
I would advise the commanding officers at Hunts
ville, and such other towns as are occupied by
our troops, to assemble the inhabitants and ex
plain, self-evident propositions, and tell them
that...
The Government of the United States has in
North Alabama any and all rights which they
choose to enforce in war— to take their lives,
their homes, their lands, their everything—
because they cannot deny that war does exist
there, and war is simply power unrestrained by
constitution or compact.
If they want eternal war, well and good; we
accept the issue, and will dispossess them and
put our friends in their p l a c e s . 23
The Army acknowledged international law as the guide
line to follow for codes of conduct.

Those orders and codes

emanating from the highest echelons of the Army, e.g., Gen
eral Orders No. 100, closely emulated the ideals of inter
national law and recommended harsh punishment for non-com
pliance.

As one moves further from the libraries of the

universities and the offices of the War Department, however,
one does not find strict compliance with these orders.
following section will examine conduct in Alabama to see
how it compares to the ideals found in international law
and army directives.

The

Chapter III
The Union Army in Alabama
During the second week of February, 1862, three Fed
eral gunboats commanded by Lieutenant S. L. Phelps, entered
Alabama on the Tennessee River with the purpose of reconnoitering the Tennessee Valley.

During its four days in

Alabama, the expedition sailed as far as the shoals of
Florence, where it was able to capture and destroy several
partially constructed Confederate gunboats.

Of particular

importance was the discovery of virtually no organized Con
federate resistance.

Most of Alabama*s troops were away,

either on the Virginia front or with the Western Army in
Tennessee.

The main burden of defense in Alabama fell

upon small mobile units of Confederate cavalry,^- which the
Federal chose to regard as guerrillas not entitled to any
2
military rights.
The Federals also found a surprisingly
strong Unionist sympathy among the inhabitants of Northern
Alabama.

Phelps was impressed with the strength of this

sentiment and- recommended recruiting this unexpected source
of manpower for the Union Army.
The first encounter with a Union force left Alabama's
private citizens optimistic.

The local Confederate report

of the expedition included these statements:

"The Federal

gunboats passed down the Tennessee River from Florence
yesterday and carried off large quantities of Government
stores.

No injury was done to private property or to the

railroad."

3

On February 26, 1862, Major-General Don Carlos
29
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Buell, the Army of the Ohio's commander, issued a pro
clamation which required the observance of the private
property rights of the inhabitants.

General Orders 13a

followed precepts upheld in international law.

"Peaceable

citizens are not to be molested in their persons and
property.

Any wrongs to either are to be promptly cor

rected and the offenders brought to punishment."

It also

required that compensation be made for any use of private
property.

That use could only be ordered by the highest

commander present.

Soldiers were forbidden to enter pri

vate residences without authority, and arrests could not
be made without the authority of the commanding general.
Any officer that neglected to provide for his troops or
made special provisions for his own comfort would be
punished.

"The Government supplies with liberality all

the wants of the soldier.

The occasional deprivations and

hardships incident to rapid marches must be borne with
patience and fortitude."

4

Early developments appeared to promise fair, rational
treatment for Alabama's non-combatants and private property.
A river expedition had confined itself to Confederate Govern
ment stores, and the commander of the Federal Army most
likely to invade Alabama had issued an order protecting the
rights of private citizens.

These optimistic notes were

quickly negated by subsequent Federal actions.
After the Battle of Shiloh, General Ormsby M. Mitchell
saw the opportunity to implement his standing orders to
secure the Memphis and Charleston Railroad in Alabama.

He

and his men arrived in Huntsville early on the morning of
April 11, 1862, and encountered no effective resistance.
Troops were sent out both eastward and westward along the
railroad, effectively ending Confederate railroad oper
ations in Northern Alabama.

These first federal troops

to remain in Alabama for an extended period compiled a
mixed record of conduct toward Alabama citizens.
record, however, does not begin in Alabama.

Their

To understand

their actions, an examination of their earlier Army exper
iences and attitudes is in order.
The majority of these troops were green, although
some had seen limited action during their movement south
ward.

At the time of their arrival in training and

staging camps in Tennessee, definite attitudes toward the
South and its citizens had been acquired.

Army life and

experiences modified the early idealistic aim of reuniting
the nation to include a bitterness toward the South that
necessitated severe punishment for its citizens.

These

early Federal volunteers of the Western Theater were im
mediately at odds with their superiors and the military
bureaucracy in Washington, D.C., as to what was the proper
policy toward Southern citizens.

There appeared to be a

resentment building against the official policy of re
specting the property of both loyal and disloyal citizens
as early as the latter half of 1861.

The supposition that

the "secesh" deserved a stiff punishment for being, rebels
and. traitors to the "glorious Union" became prevalent.
Wilbur F. Hinman, a member of the Sherman Brigade, Army of
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the Ohio, reflecting after the war, believed that the ideas
of the lower ranking soldiers on the subject of "confis
cation" were far "in advance of those held by the double
starred generals, and the statesmen at Washington who were
steering the ship."

Hinman calculated a two year time lag

existed between the official policy and the early attitudes
of advocating strict punishment held by the common troops
in the Western Theater.

5

This harsh attitude did not spring up unrestrained;
a strong impression existed in the minds of these young
troops that they must obey orders.
the first day of training:
duty of a soldier."

They had been told from

"this was the first and greatest

Hinman stated:

"...in our simplicity

[re-obeying orders] we allowed chickens to bite us and pigs
to squeal for Jeff Davis with impunity; we wouldn't disturb
a feather or a hair.

...But the innate forces were only

slumbering and gathering strength for future months and
years."1,6
The easiest avenue for punishing the South and ex
pressing. resentment toward her citizens was "gobbling", as
soldiers of the Eighty-eighth Illinois Volunteers called it.
Gobbling or foraging was the acquisition of desired items,
"often done by purchase or trade, but whether or no, such'
things were had - literally "gobbled," or taken away without
heeding the owner's dissent, or caring for his opinion as to
what the price ought to be.. "

As the practice became wide

spread, all thought of compensation was dropped, and it be
came very difficult to convince the troops that they should

33
not be allowed to "go in".

General Buell continued to issue

orders forbidding foraging and soldiers did so at the risk
of severe punishment.

By the Spring of 1862 most units had

found ways to circumvent the orders and minimize the dangers
of punishment.

The guards that were posted to protect

specific property or prevent unauthorized excursions into
the countryside, were often mess-mates who would themselves
profit that evening around the cook fire.

Often, after the

army had remained in an area for some time, these "non-seeing"
guards worked themselves out of the duty "as there was
0

scarcely anything left to guard."
As experience was gained, an even more secure way of
avoiding punishment was found.

A judiciously devised dis

tribution system was set up within the camp, assuring the
company and regimental officers of choice portions from
the bounty gathered.

This system proved most effective in

averting punishment.

Often the private soldiers were sub

sequently allowed to construe the pertinent orders to suit
9
their needs.
As Wilbur Hinman recalled:
The change came by virtue of necessity.
It was
impossible to stamp out the prevalent heresy
that the soldiers ought to have whatever the re
bellious country afforded that could contribute
to their health and comfort.
The average sol
dier did not stop to consider fine questions of
moral philosophy, and if his conscience was
sometimes disturbed, it was so much the worse
for the conscience.10
By April of 1862, when troops began to arrive in
Alabama, unauthorized foraging and other action which violated
the spirit of international law had become widespread.

As the

troops experienced Alabama warfare and saw prosperous areas
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with "bounty" of which they (the common soldier) were of
ficially deprived, feelings intensified concerning what the
South owed the avenging troops of the glorious Union.
General Mitchell arrived in Huntsville, Alabama and
occupied that immediate section of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad with a division of infantry and various support units.
The total comprised about eight thousand effective men.

Ex

peditions were successful in expanding Union control over the
railroad and as early as the evening of April 12th Mitchell
was able to report:

"We have nothing more to do in this

region, having fully accomplished all that was ordered."

11

This particular appraisal of the" situation by Mitchell was
short-lived; by late April he began to repeatedly request
reinforcements.

Imagined Confederate forces were reported

to headquarters, and those that were actually seen had their
number exaggerated.

An example was an expedition against

Bridgeport, Alabama, where General Mitchell reported first
the presence of five thousand infantry and one regiment of
cavalry? later he estimated the strength of the same force
at five regiments of infantry and eighteen hundred cavalry.
The Confederate reported their strength at "4 50 raw infantry"
and "150 cavalry".

12

Mitchell grew so apprehensive that he

opened direct communications about reinforcements with
Secretary of War E. M. Stanton, going over the head of his
commander, General Buell.

Mitchell proved to be less than

ideal as an independent commander, his failings were aptly
illustrated by inability and apparent refusal to control his
troops.
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The Federal response to the harassment given by Con
federate forces wasp severe.

Mrs. W. D. Chadick, a citizen

of Huntsville reported arrests of several civilians in late
April because of their secessionist beliefs.

On April 28th,

186 2 she noted in her diary:
General Mitchell has been in a rage all the week
on account of the cutting of the telegraph poles
and lines, the tearing up of the railroad tracks,
firing into trains, and holds the citizens respon
sible, for the same, having had 12 of the most
prominent arrested.
It is probable that the work
of our Cavalry has annoyed him excessively, as
they are constantly picking off his m e n . ^
J. B. Moore of Tuscumbia recorded in his diary on
April 30, 1862, reports of Federal raids upon the countryside.
He was outraged to hear of the robbery of widows and the
taking of all the food at several plantations.

He concluded

that "it must be that the worst part of the army were sent
down in this valley."

14

May did not open on a very cheery note for the civilian
populace of North Alabama.

Captain John Beatty reported his

reactions on May 2nd after a train on which he was riding was
fired upon, wounding several men.

He had the train stopped

and took a squad of soldiers back with him to Paint Rock, the
site of the incident.

He called the citizens of the village

together and announced:
...that this bushwacking must cease.
The Federal
troops had tolerated it already too long.
Here
after everytime the telegraph wire was cut we
would burn a house; every time a train was fired
upon we should hang a man; and we would continue
to do this until every house was burned and every
man hanged between Decatur and Bridgeport..., We
proposed to hold the citizens responsible for
these cowardly assaults, and if they did not drive
these bushwackers from amongst them, we should make
them-more uncomfortable than they would be in hell.
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I then set fire to the town, took three citizens
with me, returned to the train, and proceeded to
Huntsville.^ 5
This action met with the approval of General Mitchell and en
thusiasm by Beatty's fellow officers and men.

Arrests and

the burning of all buildings in an arbitrarily set radius
from an incident became a widespread practice with no re
spect for the inhabitant's sympathies, be they pro-Union or
secessionist.
General Mitchell sought, approval for such strict
measures from Secretary of War Stanton, rather than re
questing further guidelines from his superior, General Buell.
Mitchell described for the Secretary of War, in a telegram
sent May 5, 1862, the harassment of his soldiers by what he
termed armed citizens, and guerrilla bands of cavalry.
reported, the steps taken in response.

He

"I have arrested some

prominent citizens along the line of the railway and in this
city

[Huntsville].

I hold prisoners

(citizens) against whom

the negroes will prove charges of unauthorized war.
convict on the testimony of blacks?

Have I your authority

to send notorious rebels to a Northern prison?"
absent at that time, did not answer.

Am I to

16

Stanton,

P. H. Watson, the as

sistant Secretary of War, authorized Mitchell to send two or
three notorious rebels to Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, if
Mitchell deemed it necessary. 17
Mitchell however, had to direct his attention to the
action of his Eighth brigade under the command of Colonel
John B. Turchin.

On May 2, 1862 the brigade had entered and
)

occupied Athens, Alabama, a small railroad town with Unionist
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leanings.

Upon entering, Turchin had the regiments stack

their arms, and then allowed his troops to plunder and pillage
the town and adjacent countryside, making no effort to re
strain them.

Turchin, a native of Russia and a recent im

migrant, was brought up in the East European military trad
ition of "to the victor belong the spoils".

Mitchell was

shocked by the reports of the conduct of his troops coming
from Athens.

The fact that these were troops of his command,

however, made Mitchell extremely reluctant to punish them.
The citizens of Athens presented affidavits, dated
May 3, 1862 of forty-five individuals who had suffered depradations at the hands of the officers and men of the Eighth
Brigade.

Mitchell*s refusal of their claim for $54,689.80 in

this case of undisputed atrocity was flippantly counter to
international law.

His explanation to a delegation from

Athens for his inability to punish the offenders or to offer
recompence to the citizens was. as follows:
I greatly fear, gentlemen, you are laboring under
a very serious misapprehension.
I sincerely hope
that no remarks of mine could have led you to
imagine that the government of the United States
would pay individual for robberies suffered at
the hands of individuals, acting not only without
orders, but contrary to the most positive and re
peated orders.
...those who are guilty are but
robbers and plunderers, and must be treated such.
I cannot arraign before a court, civil or military,
a brigade, and I most deeply regret that a portion
at least of your time had not been occupied in
searching for the testimony which would have fixed
the charge of pillage and plunder upon some indiv
idual officer or soldier under my command. Mitchell was forced by public pressure to recognize
the existence of outrages committed by his command and on
May 19, 1862, appeared to take positive steps toward discipline.
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He wired Secretary of War Stanton acknowledging the outrages
and asking for authority to impose stiff punishments.

The

telegrams stated in part:
The most terrible outrages - robberies, rapes,
arson, and plundering - are being committed by
lawless brigands and vagabonds connected with
the army, ...in regiments remote from headquarters,
I hear the most deplorable accounts of excesses
committed by soldiers.
I beg authority to control these plunders by
visiting upon their crimes the punishment of
death .^
This authority was granted, but Mitchell made no move to use
it.

In fact, nothing was done to discipline his troops.
The situation remained unchanged until Major-General

Don Carlos Buell's arrival in late June 1862.

His description

of the state of affairs was not heartening for the local noncombatants or the Union Army.

Troops lacked discipline and

were scattered, many times with their whereabouts unknown.
The cavalry was broken down by marches and counter-marches
seemingly for no purpose.

The civilian population which had

welcomed the arrival of Union troops became embittered by the
treatment received from the soldiers acting with the apparent
approval of their commander.

No supplies had been provided

for the Army after its arrival from Corinth, little if any
thing had been done to repair and open the railroad to
Nashville, and the wagon trains were worn down from hauling
cotton for speculation.

No reforming measures of any kind

had been initiated by General Mitchell.
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In fact, citing an

inability to work with his commander, General Buell, Mitchell
had arranged through the Secretary of War, a transfer to the
Eastern Theater.

This done, he left four days after Buell's
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arrival in Huntsville.
Buell then attempted personally to straighten out the
situation in North Alabama.

A general court-martial was con

vened at Athens on July 7, 1862, to try Colonel Turchin and
other officers of the Eighth Brigade.
Turchin faced three charges.

In particular, Colonel

Turchin was first charged with

"neglect of duty, to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline."
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.

.

This charge dealt with Turchin's allowing his

command to march into Athens and then plunder and pillage the
town and countryside in his presence or with his knowledge,
while doing nothing to restrain them.

Specific examples of

this included soldiers entering houses, taking all the pro
visions and clothing they could lay their hands on while
maliciously damaging and destroying anything they could or
would not take, including carpets, pianos, furniture and
libraries.

The businesses of the town were broken into and

their cash and goods taken.

Part of the brigade went to an

outlying plantation and "quartered in the negro huts for
weeks, debauching the females and roaming with the males
over surrounding country to plunder and pillage."
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The second charge was for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman".
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This dealt with Turchin1s failing

to make any "reasonable, and proper” effort to prevent the
behavior of his troops as described in the first charge.2^
The third charge was concerned with Turchin's violation of
General Orders 13a.
chin guilty.
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A detail of seven officers found Tur

On August 6, 1862, Turchin was sentenced "to

be dismissed from the service of the United States".
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This
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was not well received by the officers and men of the division.
Many felt that Turchin had acted reasonably under the circum
stances and Buell's insistence on a court-martial decreased
even more the general's popularity with the men.

Buell was

thought to be hampering the war effort by his insistence on
strict discipline and moderate conduct.

In line with their

opposition to Buell and their leaning toward punishment of
the South, six members of the court recommended clemency on
the grounds that "the offense was committed under exciting
circumstances, and was one rather of omission than of com
mission.

The general commanding [Buell]

...felt constrained

nevertheless to carry the sentence into effect."
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Colonel Turchin, however, was not without friends in
the War Department.

On August 5, 1862 he was appointed

brigadier-general, United States Volunteers.

He accepted the

commission on September 1, 1862 and remained in service until
October of 1864.
After the occupation of Corinth, Mississippi, on May 30,
1862, Northern Alabama saw increased Union troop movements as
Halleck focused attention on taking and controlling eastern
Tennessee.

A stream of Union soldiers poured eastward through

the Tennessee Valley on their way to Chattanooga and other
points in Georgia and Tennessee.

Many of these soldiers found

time to record their impressions of the land they were passing
through.

Wilbur Hinman, marching across Alabama in June, 186 2

reported that their strict orders against foraging were allowed
to lapse, action that the troops appreciated, for as Hinman
stated:

"the country through which we passed afforded us
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frequent relief from the regulation diet".
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Upon arrival

in Decatur, Alabama on June 28th Hinman recorded a telling
impression:

"But General Mitchell had recently been there,

and its deserted streets and blackened ruins told the story
of his devastating visit".
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Moving on through the country,

Hinman1s brigade camped one evening near an isolated plan
tation.

The men "borrowed" books from the library and also

a few articles of "domestic use", all of which they promised
to return after the war.

The plantations* poultry and produce

were not spared from this "borrowing".

Hinman admitted that

such action would surely be condemned if committed at the
time his book was published (1897), "but in those days the
precepts of the Bible were to the average soldier, less potent
as a controlling influence than an empty stomach".^
Hinman *s unit was not the only one while marching
across Alabama to disobey orders.

Asbury Kerwood of the

Fifty-seventh Indiana Volunteers remembered June in Alabama
as being the time when the troops were first allowed the free
use of fence-rails for fires, etc. without opposition from the
officers.^
The hot days of August 1862, saw an increased desire by
the Union command to ravage the countryside.

C. W. Wills,

writing a letter to his sister, reported of orders given them
to "put every woman and child (imprison the men) across the
line that speaks or acts secesh, and to burn their property,
destroy all their crops, cut down growing corn, and burn all
the cribs.

That is something like war".

sit well with: all federals.

Such orders did not

The thought of burning a house
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of familiar "secesh" was repulsive, but there was no doubt
of the "justice" of such orders, Wills believed.

32

Stationed at Tuscumbia, Wills noted that the people
were taken aback by the free and easy manner in which the
federal soldiers "gobbled" their possessions.

He wrote:

We are raking in about 100 bales of cotton per
day and could get more if we had the trans
portation.
It makes the chivalry howl, which
is glorious music to our ears, and the idea of
considering these confederacies something else
than erring brothers is very refreshing.33
General Buell lost his command late in 1862, largely
because of his moderate policies and his Democratic politics.
A commission was convened in Cincinnati during November of
186 2 to investigate charges that Buell had hampered the
achieving of Union objectives.

Parts of the testimony heard

during the commission dealt with conduct in Northern Alabama.
Captain Joseph J. Slocum, a defense witness and commissary of
subsistence was questioned by General Buell about the conduct
of troops under General M i t c h e l l s command.

He answered:

We had some regiments in that division who were
extremely hard to control; but they were partic
ularly good at the warfare that was carried on
t h e r e , ! suppose, of abusing the people.
For in
stance, the Nineteenth Illinois has the credit of
having a hard reputation.
The Tenth Ohio was a
pretty good regiment in that way, but it was under
discipline.
These regiments, particularly the
Nineteenth Illinois, were kept out, I believe, as
much as possible to the extreme for bushwacking
purposes, as we called it.
They were very good at
that and a very fine regiment when brought into
action.34
Another defense witness, Colonel Marc Mundy of the Twentythird Kentucky Infantry, stated that articles in Northern
newspapers condemning Buell*s policies had a demoralizing
effect on the troops.

Such articles were able to convince
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the troops that it was their right to punish the South.
This in combination with the publication of General Pope *s
announced "tough western" policy (upon taking command of
the Army of the Potomac) made it difficult to keep the
troops disciplined.

35

The commission found that Buell

could not be punished for following a conciliatory policy.
They reasoned that it was at that time understood to be
the policy of the Government and he could violate no orders
36
on the subject, because there were none.
General W. S.
Rosecrans assumed command of the Army of the Ohio in October,
1862 bringing an end to the "conciliatory" policy orders of
his predecessor.
It was the Autumn of 1863 before Northern Alabama again
saw large concentrations of Union troops.

By then, taking

items that might add to one's comfort was standard procedure
for many of the soldiers finding themselves in Northern
Alabama.

Large scale foraging became common practice.

As soon as we came in sight of camp, the infantry
went in squads in search of meat, with guns.
The
woods were full of hogs, and it soon sounded like
heavy skirmishing, General.Smith, riding in great
fury back and forth, endeavoring to punish the
guilty parties and put a stop to it. He tied up
several men by the limbs all night, but the boys
got their hogs.
He is gettin unpopular very fast
with the men.
Later, J.. L. Jones wrote again of General Smith's
inability to enforce strict discipline.

In November of 1863,

he wrote that a camp guard was established to keep the men
from leaving the camp with guns.

The men had been accustomed

for too long to easy foraging, however, to be stopped.

The

guards looked the other way as meat and other supplies were
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brought into camp.

J. L. Jones recorded that his mess

had "six chickens, a beef and a goose ... on stock for
38
eight m e n " .

This same unit altered its behavior in

regards to foraging when their rations changed.

When

fresh meat was issued to the men, hardly any foraging for
farm animals took place, rather the men confined their ef
forts to finding fodder for their animals.
Moses D. Gage, moving across Alabama in late 18 63,
recorded events which occurred as his unit marched through
areas not previously visited by the Union Army.
The people were astonished at the coolness with
which their well-filled larders were emptied
of the precious contents.
But entreaties and
tears were of no avail.
With a simple inquiry
"Where is the man who belongs here?" and the
reply "he is in the army;" they were well sat
isfied of their right to consume the supplies
of armed foes.
They often presumed that the
husband, son, or brother was absent as an armed
rebel, without making any preliminary inquiry.
...And, a very good reason, in addition to all
this, was that these people were living much
better than the army not withstanding their
enmity, and this ought not to be permitted.
And it is worthy of remark that for a time few
fared better than the soldiers.39
Charles W. Wills wrote to his sister in December of
1863 that he was ordered to do duties which distressed his
sense of moral conduct.

He thought that he had done his

worst when ordered to confiscate horses and mules.

Now,

however, he was told to go and confiscate all the sheep he
could find.

Wills considered this to be stealing as the

people he was taking the sheep from were poor with hardly
an item of sustenance, certainly not a well off Southern
plantation owner. 40

Wills was proud of the fact that none

45
of the men under his command were guilty of unauthorized
robbery, plundering, or stealing.

He believed that he was

the only officer in his detachment that could make such a
claim.

He consistently discouraged such conduct and kept

a close eye on his men.

He wrote in a letter to his sister

that he was willing to be responsible for all that they
did.41
Those inhabitants of Alabama who suffered the most
from Federal troops were the people living on isolated farms
in the back country.

They had no one to appeal to for pro

tection, especially on those farms whose men were off with
the army.

Besides finding themselves the victims of or

ganized foraging expeditions, they were also terrorized by
tL

the stragglers and renegades from both armies.

The philosophy

of even the most moderate unit in the field was at least the
equivalent of the suggestion by one of the staff officers of
the Sherman Brigade.

Major William McLaughlin told his men

"when you're out, d o n 11 starve".
Colonel Hans C. Heg, writing home described a visit to
a plantation:
I got a good glass of wine and some nice Ham,
Bread, Milk and preserves for my Dinner.
She
was a widow woman - and was very anxious to
have some one stay and take care of her chickens,
turkeys and geese.
I took as'good care of her
as I could - but the boys got about all her
geese, and turkeys anyhow.
...Our living has been good now for a few days plenty of peaches - chickens, turkeys, and
sweet potatoes.
Food was not the only item taken by troops as they
passed, farms.

Furniture was often destroyed, anything val
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uable and portable was carried away and anything left, in
cluding all buildings, was usually set afire.

The Coleman

family near Athens had the misfortune of being visited.
The unit ransacked the house from top to bottom.

They de

stroyed the furniture and other household items.

Mrs.

Coleman pleaded with the man who she thought was in charge,
to stop the men.

His reply was "Damn you, I have no pro

tection for you - pitch into that home, men and sack it."
They continued to search for valuables and when nothing
more could be found, the house was set afire.

The women

of the farm were left watching the buildings burn.
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Thomas Stevenson marching with the Seventy-eighth
Ohio Volunteer Infantry over the Sand Mountains of Northern
Alabama noted that the area was inhabited by many poor and
destitute people, unlike the prosperous areas along the
Tennessee River.

The passing of the Army threw great terror

into them and despite their poor economic condition "many of
them [were] robbed and plundered of everything". 44

Benjamin

McGee and the Seventy-second Indiana Volunteer Infantry went
into camp near Mooresville, Alabama in February, 1864.

He

wrote that if there was one thing this particular unit ex
celled, it was its ability to forage.

Colonel Biggs of the

One Hundred Twenty Third Illinois, however, issued strict
orders to the Seventy-second that foraging should entirely
cease, any soldier caught foraging or with any forage in his
possession would be severly punished.

McGee wrote:

Of course our boys were too good soldiers and too
well drilled in discipline not to obey; but the
first thing they did after getting the order, was
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to dig in each bunk a subterrean receptable for
hams, chickens, pigs, flour, dried fruit, potatoes,
and molasses, which somehow or other, would keep
coming into camp and getting into the very places
prepared to receive them.45
This ability to "encounter" such forage by McGee and his unit
was all the more remarkable as they were camped in the Sand
Mountains region, the area mentioned by Stevenson as being so
poor.
Northern Alabama, along the Tennessee River, remained
a rich store house for passing troops, but the years of Federal
presence there had taken its toll.

Carrol Quenzel marched with

the Thirty-ninth Ohio Volunteers to Decatur, Alabama in midApril 1864.

Quenzel described Decatur as a town that had

"suffered more from the ravages of war" than any place he had
been.

"A great many of the buildings have been torn down to

give range for the Batteries, and for the formation of Rible
pits.

There are no citizens here.

All the inhabitants have

been sent away, both loyal and disloyal."
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Huntsville had suffered also at the hands of the Federals, but not to the degree of Decatur.

By 1864 the local

commander no longer had to ask permission of the Secretary of
War to send citizens behind the lines.
in her diary that:

Mrs. Chadick recorded

"Twelve of the most prominent citizens,

original secessionists, have been arrested and called upon to
take the oath of allegiance.

They all refused to a man, and

are ordered to leave the lines".

47

Officers were often quar

tered with local citizens during their stay in Huntsville.
Mrs. Chadick reported good experiences with her forced boarders.
Although she did not welcome them, those that stayed with her

48
were well behaved and did not damage her property.

She

recorded in her diary though, that such destruction was
not an unusual experience.

Many of the officers and their

wives plundered the houses they were staying in when
ordered to move on.
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The local clergy were not immune

from Federal scrutiny either.

Mrs. Chadick wrote on Dec

ember 31, 1864 that:
Mr. Bannister (Episcopal rector) received notice
today that, if he could not pray for Lincoln, he
could not officiate in his church on the morrow
and that he would be sent South.49
She went on to record that she personally knew of many Fed
eral officers who were ashamed of the way the Army acted to
ward the local civilians.

Officially, though it was known

that the Confederate cavalry was operating in the area, the
Federals insisted that it was the work of the bushwhackers
and renegades supported by the inhabitants.

On that premise

many house burnings took place in retribution for attacks on
Federal troops and any prisoners captured were often not ac
corded the rights of prisoner of war, but rather treated as
criminals.^ •
Mrs. Chadick saw no rhyme or reason to the Federal acts.
Mr. Jolly, a Huntsville native with Unionist sympathies, found
his house plundered.
...they took everything that they could lay their
hand upon.
Childrens clothes, jewelry, hoop skirts,
going into the rooms where the young ladies were
not yet out of bed.51
A friend, Mr. Bob Smith, was "deported" without warning when
he went down to the train to see Dr. Ross off, who was being
"deported".

His crime was that he offered the doctor some
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money for the trip.

For that action, he was carried off

without getting to tell his family of the situation or the
opportunity to get a change of clothes.
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William Hartpence, with the Fifty-first Indiana Vol
unteers, found himself in the area north of Athens in Dec
ember 1864.

Although much visited by Federals, it still had

much to offer an enterprising forager.

He reported that:

[we]...were subsisting largely off the fat of
the land - which was pretty fat at that time.
...The way we absorbed the material products
of that section, must have created in the
minds of the natives grave apprehension of a
famine.
"Are you-uns-all gwine t* ruin weuns-all?" they asked; and we assured them
that we had come to save themI Then we went
on saving the fine sweet potatoes, dried
fruit, pork, honey, etc. which these hypo
critical people had been industriously cul
tivating and preserving to feed the rebel
army with.^3
Extreme South Alabama did not have the same ex
tensive experience with Union troops which Northern Alabama
had.

Its experience was limited to minor cavalry raids

from Union forces based in Florida and then in the closing
days of the war, the taking of Mobile by a Union fleet and
army.
The greatest activity by Union forces in South Alabama
occurred in 1865.

The Reverend Timothy H. Ball reporting on

a small expedition which passed through Clarke county wrote
that very little damage was done.

A building was burned, and

the troops committed "some havoc", but two hundred bales of
cotton were either not noticed or ignored.
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Conecuh county

was not. as fortunate in its experience with an expedition
from Florida.

B. F. Riley, historian of the county, reported

50
that the Federal troops entered Evergreen, Alabama without
resistance.

Even so, families had their valuables stolen

and livestock driven off.
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Parthenia Hague, a school teacher employed near
Eufaula, Alabama, described the effect of receiving news
that the "Yankees are coming" on the plantation where she
lived.

As the news spread from house to house:
Planters hastily fled td/ -the swamps and the
deep unfrequented woods, with their stock
and valuables.
At intervals throughout the
day, droves of cattle and hogs were driven
past my employer1s residence to hiding places
in the woods; and wagons and carriages,:filled
with whatever valuables could be quickly gotten
together, were also passing by.^6

The women were left on the plantation to greet the Yankees.
Miss Hague did not resent the fact that the planter did not
stay.

She and the other women believed that his presence

would have done them no good and perhaps harm.

She cited

the possibilities of his being hung or tortured to discover
the hiding place of his valuables.

These were actions which

she had heard of occurring elsewhere.
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Miss Hague was par

ticularly upset that the Yankees did not respect the condition
of their victims.

If the family did not have enough food for
■\

another meal, the soldiers would obtain their satisfaction by
burning the houses, gins, and cotton.

The women and children

were forced to watch as their trunks, bureaus, and wardrobes
were kicked open.

"Whatever struck the soldiers fancy was

appropriated; to the rest of the contents, as apt as not, a
match would be applied, and the labor of years would swirl
up in smoke."
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Eliza Walker wrote of her experience with Federal
cavalry troops which visited her family plantation late in
the war.

Her mother tried to defy the troops and prevent

destruction on the grounds that a temporary armistice had
been declared.

This *defianee was to no avail, the troops

took whatever appeared valuable and helped themselves to any
food that caught their eye.
left the corn cribs empty.

They turned out the stock and
Her conclusion to this visit was:

"Everywhere they went was marked by devastation."
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In South Alabama Union forces took Mobile on April 12,
1865.

At first the occupation of Mobile went smoothly; the

Federals conducted themselves according to the "rules of
civilized warfare", much to the surprise of the inhabitants.
But it was not long before the citizens began to feel the
heavy hand of the Union presence.

Mrs. Laura Robert Pillans

recorded in her journal on April 13th:
The indulgent Yanks are beginning to unsheath
their claws; already it is said they they have
been looking around for pleasant houses and
have taken such a fancy to our neighbor Maguires'
house as to signify to him their wish to possess
it and, so Mr. Me.- has nothing else to do but give
it up peaceably.
The screw begins to turn a
little.6'Q
Mrs.Pillans
later

also reported a good experience with the Army

in the month.

She

had had a horse and cart stolen

an Irishman when the Confederate Army left.
the provost-marshall and reported the event.

by

She went down to
A squad of sol

diers were sent out and soon arrested the man and recovered
the horse and cart.

The man was sent to Ship Island, and

Mrs. Pillans was well pleased with having the horse returned.
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Expeditions were sent out from Mobile to scout the
countryside.

One such expedition visited the plantation of

Alexander Anderson whose nephew, Ephraim Alexander, happened
to be visiting the plantation on sick leave from the First
Missouri Confederate Brigade.

Ephraim Anderson recorded the

effect of a visit by several squads of Union cavalry to the
plantation.

The house and outbuildings were completely sacked.

An ox and several hogs were left dead in the fields, killed
for the joy of it.

The poultry was gone and the smokehouse

cleaned out, it had contained the product of nearly fifty hogs.
All the stored vegetables were taken.

He concluded by

writing "...everything was turned upside down, and it seemed
scarcely worthwhile to straighten up, as the county was now
entirely exposed to this system of Federal plunder and de
vastation.
The occupation of Mobile under active war conditions
was short lived, on May 5, 1865, General Taylor surrendered
the remaining Confederate forces east of the Mississippi
River to General E. R. S. Canby at Citronelle, Alabama.
to the brevity of action, no record of Union conduct was
clearly established in South Alabama.

Due

Chapter IV
The Cavalry Raids
Alabama was not the scene of large armies maneuvering
against each other, it did experience extensive raids by
Union cavalry.

The State's position as a major supplier of

foodstuffs and manufactured goods to the Confederacy caused
it to be the object of raids, which were also intended to
divert Confederate attention away from the Union Army's main
objectives.
The scene of many minor raids by mounted Federals,
Alabama was also the unwilling host of three major raids.
Colonel A. D. Streight led the first major raid in April of
1863, Major-General L. H. Rousseau followed with a more suc
cessful raid in July of 1864, and in April of 1865, MajorGeneral J. H. Wilson led what has been called a model raid
through the heart of Alabama.
Streight introduced large scale cavalry operations to
Alabama with seventeen-hundred men mounted on mules
a supply mix-up) on April 21, 1863.

(through

His aim was to create

confusion in the rear of General Braxton Bragg's Confederate
Army, seek recruits among the Union sympathizers in Northern
Alabama and to destroy what Confederate Government supplies
he could find.

His written orders read in part:

For all property taken for the legitimate use of
your command you will make cash payments in full
to men of undoubted loyalty; give the usual con
ditional receipts to men whose loyalty is doubtful,
but to rebels nothing.
You are particularly com
manded to restrain your command from pillage and
marauding.
You will destroy all depots of supplies
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of the rebel army, all manufactories of
guns, ammunition, equipment, and clothing
for their use.-*The raid was designed with General G. M. Dodge to
lead a cavalry feint due south through Alabama to draw off
Forrest, while Streight headed toward Rome, Georgia,

The

feint did not work and Forrest was soon dogging Streight*s
every step.

Streight barely had time to confiscate fresh

horses as Forrest kept after him twenty-four hours a day.
Streight was forced to stop because of exhaustion near Cedar
Bluff, Alabama, and Forrest, with a much smaller force, was
able to bluff him into surrendering.

Streight did not have

time to show whether he would have followed his written or
ders concerning pillaging and marauding.

Almost all his

time was spent trying to elude capture.
General Dodge had more time to conduct his secondary
raid, and faced no effective opposition.

Daniel Ambrose,

riding with Dodge, recorded his impressions.
April 23rd:

"Today we witness war's desolating scourge on

the plantations.
their work.

He wrote on

The devouring elements of fire are doing

The Alabama Union cavalry and the Kansas Jay-

hawkers are on the war path? their day has come - their day
of retribution."

2

The Alabama Union cavalry built their

reputation of being especially harsh on the citizens of the
South at this time, but for most of the war, they were unable
to live up to that reputation as they were dismounted due to
lack of horses.
Dodge *s accomplishments were summed up as having de
solated the garden spot of Alabama, while inflicting deserved
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punishment on her citizens.

Dodge reported:

"Cattle,

sheep, cows, and hogs we captured and used by the thousands,
and I did not leave a thing in the valley that I considered
would in the least aid the enemy."
command had conducted itself well.

3

Dodge believed that his
He could recall but one

instance in his report where his troops disobeyed his orders
and burned some houses.

He issued orders that anyone caught

in such an act would be shot.
4
except by my order".

After that "nothing was burned

Streight's raid did not give a true picture of how a
cavalry raid could affect non-combatants and their private
property.

General Dodge had more opportunity to conduct a

raid as he pleased, but his was but a small feint and did not
serve as an actual example of a major raid in action.

Gen

eral L. H. Rousseau was issued orders in the summer of 1864
which authorized another Federal raid.

The orders gave Gen

eral Rousseau opportunity to exercise his own discretion on
treatment of non-combatants and private property.
On July 10, 1864, Major-General L. H. Rousseau began a
cavalry raid into Alabama that would last nine days and cover
300 miles.

He had two brigades with which to divert attention

and create’confusion in the rear of Johnston's Army during
Sherman's Atlanta campaign.

Rousseau's main objective was to

destroy the West Point and Montgomery Railroad and therefore
sever Atlanta's link with Montgomery.

Rousseau was ordered

by Sherman to avoid fighting as much as possible and to concen
trate on making a successful deep, sharp raid against the rail
road.

Forage, meat, and corn meal were to be obtained from
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farms.

With such a strong emphasis on timing, Rousseau had

to travel light.

Incidental to destroying the railroad

Rousseau was to strike terror into the "heart of rebeldom"
proving that no part of the Confederacy was safe from at
tack by Federal troops.
All accounts written of Rousseau's raid comment on
how tightly he was able to keep his men in rein and how
private property was generally spared destruction.

The Con

federate military report by Major W. T. Walthal of Rousseau's
action in Talladega, Alabama stated:
They acted with unusual forbearance.
No damage was
done to private property except in one or two excep
tional cases.
Safeguards were furnished to various
families who applied.
The railroad station house
was burned, but pains were taken by them to save at
least, a portion of the private property that happened
to be stored in it. No effort was made to tear up
the track.
The post office was r a n s a c k e d . ^ .
Major Walthal did report that some private property was de
stroyed by the passing Federal troops.

Between Greensport

and. Talladega, two iron manufactories were burned and in
Talladega, a factory not in operation at the time, which
g
manufactured small-arms, was destroyed.
Missed by the
troops was a camp about a mile outside of town which served
as a basic training center for the home guard.

7

Rousseau reached the West Point - Montgomery Railroad
at Loachapoka, Alabama.
of track.

There he tore up some thirty miles

The depot in Loachapoka took fire accidentally

from the burning ties and other materials on the nearby track.
Rousseau had his men fight the fire and with great exertion
was able to keep it from spreading beyond the railroad
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buildings.

8

After leaving Loachapoka Rousseau made his

way into Georgia and joined Sherman.
By far the largest cavalry raid carried out in
Alabama was Wilson's in April of 1865.

Designed as a

severe blow to the heart of the South, it has been called
the example of a large cavalry operation.

Its purpose was

to create a major diversion for Canby's action against
Mobile.

General James H. Wilson's orders gave him ample

discretion as an independent field commander.

Gerald

Wilson had at his command approximately thirteen thousand
effective troops.

After a three week delay due to rain,

the raid began on March 22, 1865.

The Tennessee Valley

through which it first moved had been devastated by two
years of constant warfare.

General Wilson was obliged to

scatter his troops over a wide expanse of the country in
order to provide his command with sustenance as it passed
through the valley and the poor hill country to the south
of it.

The Federals had no fear of organized Confederate

resistance since Forrest was camped at West Point, Mississ. . 9
ip.pi.

Benjamin McGee with the Seventy-second Indiana

Volunteers recalled his orders received before commencing
the. raid were "to get our living and forage off the country,
and to take with us or destroy everything that would be of
service to the rebel cause".^
On March 30th, General Wilson ordered General John T.
Croxton's brigade detached with orders to move on Tuscaloosa.
This action wad done to cover Wilson's supply trains from
the Confederates.

Croxton's orders read in part:

"proceed
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rapidly by the most direct route to Tuscaloosa to destroy
the bridge, factories, mills, university

(military school),

and whatever else may be of benefit to the rebel cause".

11

Advance scouts from Croxton1s brigade reached Tusca
loosa on April 3rd.

A3 they passed the time waiting for

Croxton, they became bold, roaming the streets.

Renegade

Southerners joined them and drinking became widespread, which
resulted in numerous reports of looting.

12

After Croxton

arrived the business of destroying the university and various
factories was undertaken.

Although the school was defended

by a small corps of its cadets, they were no match for the
Union soldiers and: after putting in an appearance, they beat
a hasty retreat toward Montgomery.

Almost the entire plant

of the school was put to flames, which spread to neighboring
houses.
At the Rotunda, Professor Andre DeLoffre made a
brave attempt to save the library, of which he
was custodian.
He appealed to the officer in
charge of the raiding squad to spare one of the
finest libraries in the whole South.
The of
ficer himself must have had some appreciation
for books.
He restrained his men while he sent
to General Croxton a message asking whether it
was imperative for this excellent library to be
burned.
The General replied curtly that his
orders left him no discretion; the library must
go.
The officer then... ordered the building
burned.^3
Only four buildings~ ~from the University of Alabama *s campus
survived Croxton1s visit.

Ironically, one of those was the

Round House, the only campus building erected expressly for
military purposes.
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Selma was one of the prime objectives of Wilson's raid.
It was a major manufacturing center for the South.

Within

its boundaries, almost every type of war material was
manufactured.

Selma had assumed the position of a major

supply point for the South in 1863 and expanded that role
during the subsequent years.

There were arsenals and iron

works, which turned out shell and shot, and items ranging
from horseshoe nails to steam boilers.

Clothing was also

made within Selma’s confines, as was leather gear, chains
and wagon equipment.

A saltpetre factory was located there

and at the time of the raid, an iron river boat ram was
nearing completion in the shipyard.. 15

Selma’s importance

was such that General Nathan B. Forrest deemed it necessary
to defend the town against the raid.

He dismounted his men

to man the trenches and called every able bodied citizen of
the town to assist in its defense.
Wilson had his men in position opposite the defense
trenches of Selma by late afternoon of Sunday, April 2nd.
He decided to attack that evening and after a sharp exchange,
was able to break the defense line and enter the city.

By

ten Union troops had control of the town and had captured a
major portion of the defending Confederate troops.

General

Forrest was able to escape by fleeing just as Union troops
entered the town proper.
The night attack contributed to general confusion and
discipline was lost as Union troops gained the town.

That

night a brick building on Broad Street was set on fire.

It

had served the Confederates as a jail for Union prisoners
and skulkers from the Southern Army.

Reportedly it was pre

vious inmates of the institution which set the fire.

This
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fire spread to other houses along Broad Street.
had no inclination to fight the fires.
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Union soldiers

During the night

private residences were broken into and any resistance was
dealt with ruthlessly.
beverages demanded.

Valuables were seized and alcoholic

The extent of plundering done by the

Union soldiers was variously reported.

Ella Smith, visiting

Selma at the time of capture, thought that reports of mistreatment to the citizens of Selma were greatly exaggerated.

17

Another resident believed that the soldiers had been told that
if they were able to take the city before daylight, they could
do as they pleased with the town until daybreak*

The town was

taken early in the evening and Mrs. C. E. Landis reported that
the Federals had all night to "drink, carouse, pillage and
burn".
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The fire in Selma continued to rage until Tudsday

night and was aided on Monday by the firing of the Naval
Foundry, Arsenal and other places of manufacturing.

The city

had nearly been destroyed, but order had been reestablished
on Monday and protection was available for those who applied
for it.

By Tuesday evening almost every private family had

a soldier or soldiers stationed on their premises.
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After occupying Selma for several days, Wilson moved
on toward Montgomery, his last major objective before leaving
Alabama.

Montgomery offered no resistance to Wilson’s arrival

and the Federal troops were able to occupy it peaceably.
Benjamin McGee reported that several steam boats and machine
shops were burned.

Also a large amount of Confederate com

missary and quarter-master stores were destroyed.

McGee made

a special note that private property was not molested.
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The Montgomery Advertiser reported on April 18th that
General Edward M. Cook did indeed protect the citizens of
Montgomery.

His promise that no destruction would take place

had been ratified by General Wilson.

A guard was posted

throughout the town and the main body of Wilson's troops
merely marched straight through on their way to Columbus,
Georgia.

A few isolated incidents of robbery were reported

in the suburbs, attributed to drunken troopers.

The largest

effort that Wilson's passing had on Montgomery was that all
the horses and mules were taken and a considerable number
negroes went off, following the army.

of
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Moving toward Columbus, orders were issued to pick up
all serviceable mules and horses and to mount each with an
able-bodied negro.

They in turn were to go out and gather

supplies for the army in the form of flour, meal, chickens,
turkeys, and pork.

Thomas Dornblaser, a volunteer with the

Pennsylvania Dragoons, reported that by this point in the
war it was believed that "a soldier who could not forage suc
cessfully might as well be in the hospital.

To have foraged

well was an achievement that called for higher compliment
than "to have fought we 1 1 " . ^
The completion of Wilson's raid and the taking of
Mobile, saw the war period come to an end in Alabama.
troops had compiled a mixed record.

Federal

Alabama was the scene of

both Federal outrages and remarkable restraint against-local
citizens and private property.

Chapter V
Conclusions
By 1861 and the start of the American Civil War, a
great storehouse of laws and precedents existed pertaining
to troop conduct.

The standards in existence during the

1860's exemplified a policy of moderation toward non-combatants
and private property.

Their rights were to be respected and

no damage to or confiscation of property done without the ex
plicit order of a superior officer.

Blanket statements of

conduct such as "seek and destroy any property that might pos
sibly be of assistance to the enemy, and harass that population
which shows any sympathy toward the enemy", were not recognized.
Rather the laws called for a consistent standard of restraint.
Alabama had extensive experience with Union troops
throughout the war.

Their conduct ranged from unusually re

strained to uninhibited pillage and marauding.

The most

powerful influence on the soldiers', conduct was their immediate
superior officer.

If the officer had the respect of his men

and believed in the protection of the non-combatant's rights,
invariably Alabama's inhabitants were spared harsh treatment
and the destruction of their property.

The men of Rousseau's

and Charles W. Will's commands were examples of this behavior.
In many instances, however, as Charles Will's experience
showed, the superior officer's desires or ideas prevailed.
If that officer or the junior officer did not believe in any
of the precepts of international law, as was the case with
Turchin, the troops were only held back by their own consciences,
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which did not always trouble them in the "spirit of the
moment".
The guerrilla warfare found in Alabama caused Union
soldiers to react harshly.

They found it very frustrating

to be faced by an enemy which could not be seen.

These

frustrations were relieved by attacking something which could
be seen, the local population.

The political beliefs held

by the population had little effect on the severity of the
treatment they received.

Orders sometimes made a distinction

between Unionist and non-Unionist, but the distinction was
rarely, if ever, made in the field.
The amount of Union sentiment among the civilian pop
ulation was a small factor in determining troop conduct.
Confederate activity in an area could certainly bring Union
wrath on a village or plantation.

Even if individuals in a

village or town espoused Union sentiment or treated their
"guests" deferentially, they had no guarantee of better treat
ment.

They were likely to suffer the same fate as those who

jeered the soldiers or made obvious their contempt for the
Union.
Generally, throughout the war, orders were issued to
respect the property as well as the person of non-combatants.
As the war progressed these orders became less strict.

Con

fiscation or destruction became the rule rather than the ex
ception.

Field soldiers, feeling little or no qualms, grew

adept at raiding the countryside for the avowed purpose of
punishing the "secesh" and "gobbling" or destroying any item
that "might further the cause of the South".
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Few- commanders in Alabama exercised enough discipline
for their’ troops to believe the punishment was anything but
an empty threat.

If a- commander stood by his orders and

punished offenders, the troops found it easy to escape de
tection and punishment.

This was the case with Jenkin Jones'

unit: and General Smith.

Often orders were nullified by the

cooperation and sometimes actual encouragement of the junior
officers.

They had the major responsibility of maintaining

proper discipline.

Guidelines from high up the chain of

command, e.g. General Orders 100 r could not counter the pre
vailing feeling that the citizens of the South deserved
punishment, not protection.
In general, the conduct of Union troops in Alabama did
not meet the standards outlined in international law or Gen
eral Orders 100..

If not restrained by a superior officer,

the common Union soldier, usually with a mid-western, rural
background, was inclined to personally punish the "secesh” .
If the soldier needed to justify his action (either to himself
or those back home), it was done by assuming a certain attitude.
This attitude held the citizens of Alabama in low esteem.

The

citizens' desires or rights needed not to be addressed since
they (the citizens)

fell into that group known as "secesh",

lucky to be left to live.

Many times when "secesh" was used

to describe Alabamians, the implication was that it pictured
something less than human.
The majority of the soldiers stationed or passing through
Alabama were volunteers, not regular army.
novelty.

Discipline was a

As their experience with the Army grew, these
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"civilian" troops began to resent strict discipline.

This

was especially true when they actually arrived in the Southern
states.

The desire to punish the South combined with the

resentment of strict discipline to make the civilian pop
ulation the target of the troops1 aggression.
The Union soldier in Alabama, whether marching through
the Tennessee Valley, occupying Huntsville or riding with
Wilson was guided in his conduct more by his empty stomach
and desire to punish the South, than by the precepts of the
Bible or international law.'*'

APPENDIX I
Head Quarters of the Army, Tampico, February 19, 1847.
eral Orders, no. 20.

1.

Gen

It may well be apprehended that

many grave offences not provided for in the act of Congress
’establishing rules and articles for the government of the
armies of the United States', approved April 10, 1860, may
be again committed —

by, or upon, individual of those armies,

in Mexico, pending the existing war between the two Republics.
Allusion is here made to atrocities, any one of which, if
committed with the United States or their organized ter
ritories, would, of course, be tried and severely punished
by the ordinary or civil courts of the land.
2.

Assassinations? murder; malicious stabbing or maiming;

rape? malicious assault and battery; robbery; theft, the
wanton desecration of churches, cemeteries or other religious
edifices and fixtures, and the destruction, except by order
of a superior officer, of public or private property, are
such offences.
3.

The good of the service, the honor of the United States

and the interest of humanity, inperiously demand that every
crime enumerated above, should be severely punished.

(para

graphs 4-6 demonstrate the necessity of a code supplemental
to the rules and articles of war.)
7.

That unwritten code is Martial L a w , as an addition to

the written military code, prescribed by Congress in the
rules and articles of war, and which unwritten code, all
armies, in hostile countries, are forced to adapt —

not

only for their own safety, but for the protection of the
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con't.

unoffending inhabitants and their property, about the
theaters of military operations, against injuries contrary
to the laws of war.
8.

From the same supreme necessity, martial law is hereby

declared, as a supplemental code in, and about, all camps,
posts and hospitals which may be occupied by any part of
the forces of the United States, in Mexico, and in, and about,
all columns, escorts, convoys, guards and detachments, of
the said forces, while engaged in prosecuting the existing,
war in, and against the said republic.
9.

Accordingly, every crime, enumerated in paragraph No. 2,

above, whether committed — 1..By any inhabitant of Mexico,
sojourner or traveler therein, upon the person or property
of any individual of the United States' forces, retainer
or follower of the same; 2. By any individual of the said
forces, retainer or follower of the same, upon the person
or property of any inhabitant of Mexico, sojourner or traveller
therein, or 3. By any individual of the said forces, retainer
or follower of the same, upon the person or property of any
other individual of the said forces, retainer or follower
of the same —

shall be duly tried and punished under the

said supplemental code.
10.

For this purpose it is ordered that all offenders, in

the matters aforesaid, shall be promptly seized and confined,
and reported, for trial, before Military Commissions to be
duly appointed as follows:
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11.

Every military commission, under this order, will be

appointed governed and limited, as prescribed by the 65th,
66th, and 97th, of the said rules and articles of war, and
the proceedings of such commissions will be duly recorded,
in writing, reviewed, revised, disapproved or approved, and
the sentences executed --all, as in the cases of the pro
ceedings and sentences of courts-martial; provided, that
no military commission shall try any case clearly cognizable
by any court-martial, and provided also that no sentence
of a military commission shall be put in execution against
any individual, whatsoever, which may not be, according to
the nature and degree of the offence, as established by evi
dence, in conformity with known punishments, in like cases,
in some one of the States of the United States of America.
12.

This order will be read at the head of every Company

serving in Mexico.

APPENDIX II
General Orders, No. 100.
Washington, April 24, 1863
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field.
Section I.

Martial Law— Military jurisdiction— Military
necessity Retaliation.

1.

A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands

in consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of
the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation
declaring martial law, or any public warning to the inhab-^
itants, has been issued or not.

Martial law is the immediate

and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest.
The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.
2.

Martial law does not cease during the hostile occupation,

except by special proclamation, ordered by the commander-inchief, or by special mention in the treaty of peace concluding
the war, when the occupation of a place or territory continues
beyond the conclusion of peace as one of the conditions of
the same.
3.

Martial law in a hostile country consists in the sus

pension by the occupying military authority of the criminal
and civil' law, and of the domestic administration and govern
ment in the occupied place or territory, and in the substi
tution of military rule and force for the same, as well as
in the dictation of general laws, as far as military neces
sity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation.
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The commander of the forces may proclaim that the admin
istration of all civil and penal law shall continue either
wholly or in part, as in times of peace, unless otherwise
ordered by the military authority.
4.

Martial law is simply military authority exercised in

accordance with the laws and usages of war.

Military oppres

sion is not martial law; it is the abuse of the power which
that law confers.

As martial law is executed by military

force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be
strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and
humanity— virtues adorning a soldier even more than other
men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his
arms against the unarmed.
5.

Martial law should be less stringent in places and coun

tries fully occupied and fairly conquered.

Much greater

severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual
hostilities exist or are expected and must be prepared for.
Its most complete sway is allowed— even in the commander's
own country-~when face to face with the enemy, because of
the: absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount
duty to defend the country against invasion.
To save the country is paramount to all other consider
ations .
6.

All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual

course in the enemy's places and territories under martial
law, unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying
military power; but all the functions of the hostile govern
ment— legislative, executive, or administrative— whether
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of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under
martial law, or continue only with the sanction, or, if
deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or in
vader .
7.

Martial law extends to property, and to persons, whether

they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.
*

13. Military jurisdiction is of two kinds:

First, that which

is conferred and defined by statute; second, that which is
derived from the common law of war.

Military offenses under

the statute law must be tried in the manner therein directed;
but military offenses which do not come within the statute
must be tried and punished under the common law of war.

The

character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions
depends upon the local laws of each particular country.
In the armies of the United States the first is exercised
by courts-martial; while cases which do not come within the
Rules and Articles of War, or the jurisdiction conferred
by statute on courts-martial, are tried by military commissions.
14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized
nations consists in the necessity of these measures which
are indispensable, for securing the ends of the war, and which
are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.
15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of
life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose
destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests
of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy
and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or
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of peculiar danger to the captor, it allows of all de
struction of property, and obstruction of the ways and
channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all
with-holding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy;
of appropriation of whatever an enemy*s country affords
necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and
of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good
faith either positively pledged regarding agreements entered
into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war
to exist.

Men who take up arms against one another in public

war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, respons-^
ible to one another and to God.
16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty— that is,
the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or
for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight,
nor of torture to extort confessions.

It does not admit

of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation
of a district.

It admits to deception, but disclaims acts

of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not
include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace
unnecessarily difficult.
17. War is not carried on by arms alone.

It is lawful to

starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that
it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.
*

21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an
enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or
nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war.
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22. Nevertheless, as civilization had advanced during the
last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially
in war on land the distinction between the private individual
belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself,
with its men in arms.

The principle has been more and more

acknowledge that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person,
property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will
admit.
23. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or
carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual
is as little disturbed in his private relations as the com
mander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the over
ruling demands of a vigorous war.
*

25. In modern regular wars of the Europeans and their descen
dants in other portions of the globe, protection of the inof
fensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule; privation
and disturbance of private relations are the exceptions.
*

Section II. —

Public and private property of the enemy—

Protection of persons, and especially of women; of religion,
the arts and sciences— Punishment of crimes against the in
habitants of hostile countries.
*

35. Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collection,
or precious instruments, such as astronomical telescopes,
as well as hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable
injury, even when they are contained in fortified places
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whilst besieged or bombarded*
*
37. The United States acknowledges and protects, the hostile
countries occupied by them, religion and morality?

strictly

private property? the persons of the inhabitants, especially
those of women? and the sacredness of domestic relations.
Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.
This; rule does not interfere with the right of the vic
torious invader to tax the people or their property, to levy
forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property,
especially houses, lands, boats or ships, and the churches,
for temporary and military uses.
38. Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses
of the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity,
for the support or other benefit of the Army or of the United
States.
If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will
cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated
owner to obtain indemnity.
*

44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the
invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded
by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking,
even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding,
maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under
the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as
may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.
A soldier, officer, or private, in the act of committing
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such violence, and disobeying a superior ordering him to
abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such
superior.
*

47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson,
murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary,
fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier
in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only
punishable, at that time, but in all cases in which death
is not inflicted, the more severe punishment shall be preferred.
*

Section X. — insurrection— Civil War--Rebellion.
*

155. All enemies in regular war are divided into two general
classes—

that is to say, into combatants and non-combatants,

or unarmed citizens of the hostile government.
The military commander of the legitimate government,
in a war of rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen
in the revolted portion of the country and the disloyal citizen.
The disloyal citizens may further be classified into those
citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion without posi
tively aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms,
give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without
being bodily forced thereto.
156. Common justice and plain expediency require that the
military commander protect the manifestly loyal citizens
in revolted territories against the hardships of the war
as much as the common misfortune of war admits.
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The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much
as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of the
revolted portion or province, subjecting them to a stricter
police than the non-combatant enemies have to suffer in reg
ular war; and if he deems it appropriate or if his government
demands of him that every citizen shall, by an oath of alleg
iance, or by some other manifest act, declare his fidelity
to the legitimate government, he may expel, transfer, imprison,
or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves
anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the govern
ment.
Whether it is expedient to do so, and whether reliance
can be placed upon such oaths, the commander or his government
have the right to decide.
157. Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United
States against the lawful movements of their troops is levying
i
war against the United States, and is therefore treason.
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